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Ghosts of the Past and Hopes for the Future:
Article 466 and Societal Expectations
Elizabeth Ruth Carter*
This Comment wll tiace the history of the law governing component parts in Louisiana
Civil Code article 466 and its predecessor articles. It notes that civilian methods of
interpretation do little to solve the ambiguity inherent in component parts and that stare decisis
andjunsprudence constante only confuse the situation. The societal expectations test has been
designed to account for these problems and has successfully resolved the ambiguities when it is
correctly applied
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contradiction is inherent in the law. The moment that a statute is
posited, it begins to age and becomes inadequate for unanticipated
future circumstances. Life never stops. And perhaps some of the
characteristics of the Civil Law system, such as the belief that reason
can do too much, have helped to accentuate the contradiction between
law and reality'
Such is the case of the Louisiana Civil Code and in particular the
law governing component parts. Louisiana Civil Code article 466 and
its predecessor articles under the Code of 1870 have continuously
suffered from ambiguity, unforeseen changes, and a perpetual failure
to see reality because of the debate over the law. This Comment will
trace the history of component parts from the Code of 1870 through
the 2007 legislation, critique the traditional methods of civilian
interpretation in relation to the issues posed by component parts,
examine the distinction between stare decisis and jursprudence
constante, examine the unique problems faced by federal courts in
applying Louisiana substantive law, and propose practical solutions for
applying the newly amended component parts code article.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Louisiana Civil Code article 466 governs what constitutes a
component part of immovable property The implications of article
466 reach far beyond property law.3 For example, classification of a
thing as a component part of an immovable may affect seizure, real
actions, successions, community property, lesion, leases, insurance,
venue, expropriation, security rights in movables, and actions for
1. Roberto G. MacLean, Juicial Discretion im the Civil Law, 43 LA. L. REv. 45, 49
(1982).
2. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 466 (Supp. 2007).
3. See 2 A.N. YtANNoPOULOs, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: PROPERTY § 120
(4th ed. 2001).
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damages.4 In 2005 and 2006, the Louisiana legislature amended
article 466 in an attempt to finally put to rest a debate that has plagued
the article since its enactment
A. Prerevision Artcles and Juisprudence
Under the Civil Code of 1870, immobilization of movables could
occur through one of several processes:
[Article 467.] The pipes made use of for the purpose of bringing water
to a house or other estate, are immovable, and are part of the
tenement to which they are attached.
[Article 468.] Things which the owner of a tract of land has placed
upon it for its service and improvement, are immovable by
destination.
Thus the following things are immovable by destination when they
have been placed by the owner for the service and improvement of a
tract of land, to wit:
All such movables as the owner has attached permanently to the
tenement or to the building, are likewise immovable by destination.
[Article 469.] The owner is supposed to have attached to his tenement
or building forever such movables as are affixed to the same with
plaster, or mortar, or such as can not be taken off without being
broken or injured, or without breaking or injuring the part of the
building to which they are attached.6
Article 467 soon proved insufficient in light of changing building
technologies and was amended in 1912 to include a rather lengthy list
of items considered to be immovable by their nature, including:
Wire screens, water pipes, gas pipes, sewerage pipes, heating pipes,
radiators, electric wires, electric and gas lighting fixtures, bathtubs,
lavatories, closets, sinks, gasplants, meters and electric light plants,
heating plants and furnaces, when actually connected with or attached
4. Id.
5. See Act No. 301 of June 29, 2005, 2005 La. Acts 1772 (explaining that the
motivation for amending article 466 was to clarify the meaning of "permanently attached");
Act No. 765 of June 30, 2006, 2006 La. Act 1269, § 1; see also, e.g., John A. Lovett, Another
Great Debate" The Ambiguous Relationship Between the Revised Civil Code and Pre-
Revision Jurisprudence as Seen Through the Prytania Park Controversy, 48 Loy. L. REv 615,
711-14 (2002) (observing that reading the two paragraphs of former article 466 conjunctively
and not including a societal expectations test adheres more closely to treating the Louisiana
Civil Code as a true civil code); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Of Immovables, Component Parts,
Societal Expectations, and the Forehead of Zeus, 60 LA. L. REv. 1379, 1396-99 (2000)
(taking the opposite position that former article 466 should be read disjunctively and should
include a societal expectations test).
6. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 467-469 (1870).
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to the building by the owner for the use of convenience of the building
7
The courts soon recognized that even the lengthy 1912 amendment
was insufficient to cover all things that ought to be considered
immobilized.8 Accordingly, judges interpreted the enumerated list in
article 467 as illustrative rather than exhaustive.9 Notably, article 467
required attachment of the movable to the immovable, but permanent
attachment was not required.' ° Article 467 stood in contrast to article
468, where permanent attachment was required, and article 469, where
permanent attachment was presumed."
The birth of the societal expectations test, which shaped (or
plagued, depending on which academic is asked) the postrevision
jurisprudence, is generally traced to Lafleur v Foret.2 The issue in
Lafleur was whether window air-conditioning units were immovables
and therefore passed with the sale of the house. 3 The window air
conditioners clearly did not fall under articles 468 or 469 because they
were neither permanently attached nor were they attached with mortar
or plaster.4 Though window air-conditioning units were not one of the
items specifically enumerated in article 467, the court determined that
the article's list was illustrative and further analysis was required.'" The
court reasoned that the underlying purpose of article 467 was to
include in the definition of immovables those items that society
expected to be included in the definition, but that might not have been
invented or thought of at the time of drafting.6 Accordingly, the court
reasoned that "the proper standard to apply ... is a determination of
whether the non-enumerated item, is, according to contemporary
objective standards, a component of the immovable."'7 Ultimately, the
court held that window air-conditioning units did not satisfy this test.'8
The standard set forth in this case came to be called the societal
7. Act No. 51 of July 2, 1912, 1912 La. Acts 60; seeYiannopoulos, supm note 5, at
1382-83.
8. SeeYiannopoulos, supm note 5, at 1383.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 213 So. 2d 141, 148 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1968); seeYiannopoulos, supm note 5, at
1397.
13. Lafleur, 213 So. 2d at 142.
14. Id at 143-44.
15. Id. at 146-47.
16. Id at 147.
17. Id at 148.
18. Id. at 149.
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expectations test, and courts applied this test in postrevision
jurisprudence.'9
B. Postrevision Aricles
The 1978 revision eliminated the distinction between immovables
by destination and immovables by nature; however, some of the
concepts underlying those classifications remained." Notably, doctrine
on, and comments to, article 466 posit that the new article suppressed
old article 467 and the test for use or convenience of the immovable.2'
After the 1978 revision, the test of "permanent attachment" replaced
the requirement of attachment and the test of use or convenience."
The revised articles read as follows:
[Article 465.] Things incorporated into a tract of land, a building, or
other construction, so as to become an integral part of it, such as
building materials, are its component parts.
[Article 466.] Things permanently attached to a building or other
construction, such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other
installations, are its component parts.
Things are considered permanently attached if they cannot be
removed without substantial damage to themselves or to the
immovable to which they are attached.
[Article 467.] The owner of an immovable may declare that machinery,
appliances, and equipment owned by him and placed on the
immovable, other than his private residence, for its service and
improvement are deemed to be its component parts. The declaration
shall be filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in
which the immovable is located. 3
Articles 465 and 467 caused little controversy. 4 However, several
controversies emerged concerning article 466.25 Academics and judges
argued over whether the two paragraphs of the article should be read in
the conjunctive or the disjunctive.2 ' According to those involved in the
revision, the drafters originally intended the two paragraphs to
19. See, e.g., Yiannopoulos, supm note 5, at 1382-89 (discussing Lafleur and
subsequent application of the societal expectations test).
20. Act No. 728, 1978 La. Acts 1900; seeYiannopoulos, supmnote 5, at 1381-82.
21. See Lovett, supm note 5, at 673; Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, at 1386.
22. Yiannopoulos, supm note 5, at 1386.
23. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 465-467 (1980).
24. 2 YtOPOULOS, supm note 3, § 142.5.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Lovett, supm note 5, at 623; Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, at 1395.
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constitute two separate code articles, but a clerical issue with
renumbering caused them to be included in the same code article.27
Accordingly, this camp of pragmatists argued that the Legislature
intended for the two paragraphs to constitute two separate and distinct
tests for immobilization.28 Likewise, the pragmatists contended that
the Legislature intended prerevision jurisprudence to continue to apply
to the extent that it was not incompatible with the new law.29
Specifically, the pragmatist camp argued that the Lafleur societal
expectations test should be included in the application of the first
paragraph." In contrast, the purist camp argued that a literal reading of
article 466 left the meaning unambiguous." Where a code provision is
unambiguous, it must be applied as written without looking to
legislative intent.32 The second paragraph defined the first so that an
item enumerated in the first paragraph was only a component part if it
also met the test for permanent attachment in the second paragraph.3
Accordingly, the purists rejected any inclusion of the societal
expectations test in the application of article 466.34 Courts showed
near universal adherence to the approach of the pragmatist camp.
27. See Symeon Symeonides, Property PossessoryActions Against the State, 46 LA.
L. REv. 655, 687 (1986) ("It seems that the two paragraphs were placed together under a
single article as a result of historical accident rather than deliberate planning. A cursory look
at the sources of article 466 reveals that its two paragraphs were derived from two separate
articles of the Civil Code of 1870....").
28. See, e.g., Yiannopoulos, supm note 5, at 1385-87.
29. See id at 1386.
30. See Lovett, supra note 5, at 622, 704-05.
31. See, e.g., id. at 704-05.
32. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 9 (1999).
33. See Taylor S. Carroll, Note, Prytania Park Hotel Limited v. General Star
Indemnity Company: A Misapplication of Civil Code Article 466, 60 LA. L. REv. 947, 947
(2000).
34. See id.
35. E.g., Equibank v. IRS, 749 E2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985); see Yiannopoulos,
supra note 5, at 1389-90; see also, e.g., Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 E3d 909, 918 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that a drilling rig was not a component part of an oil platform on the basis of
the societal expectations test); EPA v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 826 E2d 361, 368-69 (5th
Cir. 1987) (applying the societal expectations test in holding that transformers in a brewery
building were component parts); Hyman v. Ross, 26,096, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/94); 643
So. 2d 256, 261 (applying the societal expectations test to hold that heating and air-
conditioning units were component parts of a hotel); In re Chase Manhattan Leasing Corp.,
626 So. 2d 433, 434 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1993) (adhering to the Equibankrationale to hold that a
scoreboard system is a component part of the Superdome); Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-
Boze, Inc., 527 So. 2d 1052, 1054-55 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988) (holding that wired-in light
fixtures and wall-to-wall carpeting were component parts of residences under Equibank and
the societal expectations test).
1670
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C Postrevision Jutisprudence
The postrevision application of societal expectations began in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the case
Equibank v IRS 6 The issue in Equibankwas whether chandeliers in a
St. Charles Avenue mansion were considered component parts of the
immovable. 7 Looking to Lafleur and the Expos6 des Mofs, the court
reasoned that "the views of the public on which items are ordinarily
regarded as part of a building must be considered in defining those
items which the legislature meant to include within the term electrical
installation."38 The court drew a dividing line between those electrical
installations that anyone could install by just plugging them into an
outlet and those installations that require some amount of electrical
expertise to install." Accordingly, the court held that the chandeliers
were component parts of the building because they were wired-in
appliances, rather than plugged-in appliances." In the aftermath of
Equibatk, both the state and federal courts showed widespread
acceptance of the Equibank approach to article 466, arguably leading
to a line of cases constituting jwisprudence constante.41
However, in 1999, the Fifth Circuit seemingly had a change of
heart concerning the societal expectations test.42  In Prytania Park
Hotel, Ltd v General Star Indennity Co., the Fifth Circuit, in dicta,
advocated a different application of article 466.4' First, the court
argued that a thing does not become a component part under the first
paragraph of article 466 unless it also meets the test for permanent
attachment under the second paragraph." This conjunctive reading of
the two paragraphs departed dramatically from the disjunctive reading
employed by earlier courts. Second, the court completely rejected the
societal expectations test, stating: "We are aware from Equibank that
the societal expectations canon sprang-or, more accurately, was
launched-full-grown from the forehead of an expert witness who
36. See 749 E2d at 1180.
37. Id at 1177.
38. Id. at 1179.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 1180.
41. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, at 1390; see also sources cited supra note 35.
But see Lovett, supra note 5, at 701-02 (pointing out that jurisprudence constante is only
persuasive authority and is not binding).
42. See Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 179 E3d 169, 180-83 (5th
Cir. 1999).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 179.
45. See, e.g., sources cited supa note 35.
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testified for the I.R.S. during the trial of that case." 6 Apparently, the
court took issue with the expert testimony Professor A.N.
Yiannopoulos gave to the Eqibank trial court concerning article 466
and whether chandeliers were component parts. 7 The court went on to
criticize the professor's explanation of the origin of societal
expectations, calling the origins "murky at best." 8 The court's scathing
criticism of Professor Yiannopoulos sparked a flurry of academic
controversy.49
The Louisiana Supreme Court touched on this controversy in
2001.50 The issue in Showboat Star Partnership v Slaughter was
whether gaming equipment was a component part of a vessel for
purposes of a tax exemption. 1 The court held that such equipment did
not qualify under the test for permanent attachment or under a societal
expectations theory.2 However, the court did not take the opportunity
to "officially" settle the Fifth Circuit debate until 2005."?
In Willis-Km'ghton Medcal Center v Caddo-Shreveport Sales &
Use Tax Commission, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered
whether nuclear cameras constituted component parts of a hospital
building for purposes of a tax exemption. 4 The court "officially"
adopted the Prytania Park approach, holding that the two paragraphs of
article 466 must be read in conjunction and without any societal
expectations test.5
46. Prytania Park, 179 E3d at 180.
47. Id at 180-82.
48. Id. at 180-81 & n.34.
49. See, e.g., Lovett, supra note 5, at 701 ("[A]cademic commentators... have been
quick to challenge the court's [Prytani Park] analysis in law reviews and treatises.");
Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, at 1395 (calling Judge Wiener's reference to his testimony in
Prytania Park an "unprovoked, unprecedented and unnecessary adhominem attack"); Carroll,
supra note 33, at 959 (stating that Judge Wiener's criticism was without merit and offering
structural statutory support for Yiannopoulos's testimony).
50. See Showboat Star P'ship v. Slaughter, 00-1227, p. 7 n.4 (La. 4/3/01); 789 So. 2d
554, 558 n.4.
51. Id.
52. Id. at pp. 8-9; 789 So. 2d at 559-61.
53. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm'n, 04-
0473, p. 21 (La. 4/1/05); 903 So. 2d 1071, 1085, superseded by statute, Act No. 301 of June
29, 2005, 2005 La. Acts 1772, LA. CI. CODE ANN. art. 466 (Supp. 2007).
54. Id. at p. 10; 903 So. 2d at 1078.
55. Id at pp. 32-33; 903 So. 2d at 1091-92.
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D Atermath ofWillis-Knighton
Three months after the Willis-Kmghton decision, the Louisiana
State Legislature effectively overruled the decision. 6 The Legislature
amended article 466 to read:
Things permanently attached to an immovable are its component
parts.
Things, such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other
installations, are component parts of an immovable as a matter of law.
Other things are considered to be permanently attached to an
immovable if they cannot be removed without substantial damage to
themselves or to the immovable or if, according to prevailing notions in
society, they are considered to be component parts of an immovable. 7
Following the legislative reaction to the initial decision in Willis-
Knighton, the court held a rehearing to determine the issue of the
retroactivity of its decision. 8  The court held that its opinion
interpreting article 466 and the definition of component parts would be
given prospective effect only.59 This "prospective" application limited
the court's decision to the Willis-Kmghton case itself and any cases
decided in the brief period between the initial decision and the
legislative response. In 2006, the Legislature proved unsatisfied with
its 2005 response to Wllis-Knighton. Accordingly, the Legislature
amended article 466 to apply only to "building[s] or other
construction[s]." This stands in contrast to the prior article, which
applied to immovables generally.6' The same legislative act stated that
the amendment is retroactive.62 Clearly, the court's prospective
application of Will's-Km'ghton coupled with the Legislature's retroactive
application of the 2006 amendment to article 466 is an invitation for
confusion.63 Moreover, any retroactive application of the amendment
56. See LA. CW. CODE ANN. art. 466.
57. Id
58. WlsA-Kn/ighto4 04-0473 at p. 1; 903 So. 2d at 1107.
59. Id.
60. Act No. 765 of June 30, 2006, § 1, 2006 La. Acts 1269 ("Component parts of a
building or other construction .... Things such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical, or
other installations are component parts of a building or other construction as a matter of law.
Other things are considered to be permanently attached to a building or other construction if
they cannot be removed without substantial damage to themselves or to the building or other
construction or if, according to prevailing notions in society, they are considered to be its
component parts.").
6 1. LA. C. CODE ANN. art. 466.
62. Act No. 765 of June 30, 2006, § 2, 2006 La. Acts 1269.
63. At least one court has grappled with the issue. Cajun Constructors, Inc. v. Strain,
No. 2006 CA 0443,2006 WL 3813718 (La. App. 1 Cir. Dec. 28, 2006).
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is arguably unconstitutional.' Despite the issues with regard to
retroactivity and the application of article 466 only to buildings and
other constructions, the Legislature seems to have settled the issue of
societal expectations. The societal expectations test has been an
explicit mode of immobilization under article 466 since 2005.5
Although the Legislature is considering further amendments to article
466, it appears that the societal expectations test will remain a part of
the article in some form or another. Now that the long debate of
whether societal expectations is a part of Louisiana law is settled, a
new issue emerges. The issue now is how to apply article 466 and its
societal expectations test as a practical matter.
III. CIVILIAN METHODS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Despite the best efforts of its drafters, no civil code is without
gaps and ambiguities."6 Often, the civil law judge is called upon to fill
these gaps in legislation or to decide how broad code provisions will
apply to specific fact situations.67 The societal expectations test is a
perfect example of this situation. Aside from the rather rhetorical rule
that decisions should be made in accordance with prevailing notions of
society, how exactly should a court decide the prevailing notions of
society? The civilian interpretive method chosen by the judge plays an
important part in determining what role the judge will play in reaching
a decision. 8 This choice is an exercise of judicial discretion that is
necessary for the proper functioning of any civil law system.69
The four classic methods of civilian statutory interpretation are:
logical, exegesis, free scientific research, and teleological." While
there are numerous modem variations on these techniques, this
Comment will limit discussion to these four classic methodologies. As
outlined below, each of these methods proves problematic in finding
any realistic approach to the application of article 466.
64. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 466 editor's note 1.
65. Id. art. 466.
66. See MacLean, supra note 1, at 51.
67. See id at 50-56.
68. See id.
69. Id at 51.
70. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE LAW
§§ 140-143, at 283-88 (2d ed. 1999).
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A. LogicalMethod
The logical method of statutory interpretation has its roots in
Roman law.7' This method of interpretation views the judge as a
mechanical enforcer of the legislature's will.72 Consequently, the
logical method of interpretation "treats legal questions as if they were
problems of geometry or mathematics."7 In modem civil law systems,
the logical method of interpretation is useful where a code provision
clearly applies to the facts at hand." For example, the rules governing
the writing requirement for transfers of immovable property are clear."
Without the required writing, a transfer of immovable property does
not affect third parties." In a situation such as that one, the logical
method is appropriate.7
However, other than the situation where application of a code
article is obvious, the logical method is disfavored." "[T]he image of
the judge, bound by the strictness and rigor of formal logic, is not
compatible with many of the doctrines of modem times." 9 Modem
doctrine admits the inherent flaws and gaps of a civil code and the
necessity ofjudicial discretion in light of these shortcomings."
The problem with applying the logical method of statutory
interpretation to societal expectations is obvious. Societal expectations
is a rule of flexibility and discretion, not a rule of geometry. That is,
the text of article 466 quite literally proscribes a test requiring judicial
discretion."1 What constitutes a prevailing notion of society in a
particular fact situation is a question that cannot be answered by the
strict rules of logic.82 The answer will necessarily depend on judicial
discretion, which is not allowed under the pure version of the logical
71. MacLean, supra note 1, at 46.
72. See id. at 45-46.
73. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 70, § 140, at 284.
74. See Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of Jud'cial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 LA. L.
REv. 727, 729-30 (1962).
75. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1839 (1987); Tate, supra note 74, at 729 (referring to
the requirement that transfers of immovable property be in writing on pain of nullity as a
clear provision).
76. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1839; Tate, supra note 74, at 729.
77. See MacLean, supra note 1, at 45-46 (citing JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL
LAWTRADITION 37-39 (1969)).
78. See id. at 50-51.
79. Id. at 48.
80. See id. at 49-50.
81. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 466 (Supp. 2007); see also, e.g., MacLean, supra
note 1, at 48 (noting that the conflicting interests in society are often different from the
apparent conflicts solved by law).
82. See MacLean, supr note 1, at 48.
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method.83 Consequently, this method should not be used in relation to
article 466.
B. Exegesis
Exegesis is a method of interpretation borne from a generation of
judges who showed great respect for the French Civil Code in the
wake of the French Revolution.84 Exegesis is premised on three
assumptions." First, legislation is the primary source of law.8 Second,
the code is a complete statement of the law, so the answers to all legal
questions are found either within the code or within the statutes.
Third, the code is internally consistent.88  These underlying premises
are not universally accepted today. Most scholars believe that codes
are internally inconsistent and contain gaps.'
In its application, exegesis "focus[es] attention on textual analysis
and on a search for the legislative intent."' Where the law is clear, it is
applied as written. In the case of ambiguity, a judge must first try to
"discover [the law's] true meaning by a profound examination of the
provision itself... [and then] consider the provision in context."93 Put
otherwise, "[t]he first step consist[s] of extracting an unstated legal
principle or distinction, called a 'construct,' from the legislative text."94
Consequently, "[t]he second step [is] to deduce legal consequences
from the construct."9
1. Problem with Constructs
Choosing a construct is a highly subjective process lacking
consistency 6 Judges form constructs in a manner that suits their
purposes by characterizing facts a particular way and by drawing lines
83. Id.
84. YtANNoPoULOS, supra note 70, § 141, at 285-86.
85. See Mitchel de S.-O.-'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits: Judicial Discourse in
the French Legal System, 104YALEL.J. 1325, 1331 (1995).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See MacLean, supa note 1, at 49.
91. YIANNOPOULOS, supa note 70, § 141, at 285.
92. Id.
93. Id
94. Marie-Claire Belleau, The 'luristes Inquiets " Legal Classicism and Criticism in
Early Twentieth-Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 379, 391.
95. Id
96. See id.
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of division where they best see fit.97 The end result is the creation of
arbitrary and contradictory constructs that are not necessarily
consistent or applicable from case to case.98 In this respect, constructs
can be strikingly similar to the common law approach.
For example, consider the Eqibank case, where the court drew a
line between two types of electrical appliances: those installed by
inserting a plug into a wall outlet and those requiring some amount of
electrical expertise to install." Under the method of exegesis, this line
of distinction would be the construct.'0 In other words, the court's
construct is that the Legislature intended to draw this line of distinction
between plugged-in appliances and wired-in appliances.'"' From that
construct necessarily followed the outcome that chandeliers are
component parts because they are wired-in appliances.' 2
The problem with exegesis constructs becomes apparent when
the hypothetical Equibankconstruct is applied to another fact situation.
For example, suppose a home has a wireless doorbell system. A
wireless doorbell system consists of an outdoor transmitter and an
indoor receiver. The outdoor transmitter contains a button that sends a
message via radio waves, rather than electrical wiring, to the indoor
receiver when someone pushes the button. Upon receiving the radio
message, the indoor receiver makes noise. The outside unit has been
permanently attached to the outside of the home. The receiver is
installed by simply plugging a small unit into a wall outlet. When the
home is sold, the outside unit will be included in the sale of the home
because it is a component part via permanent attachment. But, what
about the receiver inside? Under the construct of Equibank, the inside
receiver is not a component part because it is a plugged-in appliance."'
Presumably, a court faced with these facts might draw a different
construct so as to include the receiver. The end result is that different
and conflicting constructs are drawn in various fact situations to
achieve the result desired by the court."
97. SeeYANNoPOULOs, supra note 70, § 141, at 285-86.
98. See Belleau, supra note 94, at 391-92.
99. Equibank v. IRS, 749 F2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985).
100. See, e.g., Belleau, supra note 94, at 391 (describing the method of exegesis).
101. See id
102. See Equibank, 749 E2d at 1179-80.
103. See id. For the purposes of this hypothetical, omit the possibility that the indoor
receiver is a component part under the societal expectations test.
104. See Belleau, supra note 94, at 391-92.
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2. Problem with Focus on Legislative Intent
One of the cornerstones of exegesis is the search for legislative
intent.'°5 Adherence to original legislative intent, however, runs
contrary to the express language of the societal expectations test. 6
Article 466 specifies: "Other things are considered to be permanently
attached to a building or other construction ... if, according to
prevailing notions in society, they are considered to be its component
parts."'' 7 Clearly, the foundational premise behind this test is that as
society changes, what constitutes a component part will change. Thus,
a movable that was not a component part in 2005 or 2006, when the
legislation was enacted, might be considered a component part a
decade later.' 8 To be sure, the apparent legislative intent of the societal
expectations test could be characterized as the intent that the article
adapt to situations the legislature could not foresee. By admitting that
they could not foresee all future problems, the Legislature essentially
instructed judges not to look to original legislative intent by including
the language "according to prevailing notions in society." Thus, the
Legislature's language does not support the use of exegesis as an
interpretive method.
C Free Scientific Research
The realization that exegesis, alone, was not a sufficient
interpretive technique led to the development of free scientific
research."' The free scientific research method is not designed to
operate in isolation, but rather where other interpretive methods fail."'
In contrast to exegesis, the foundational theory of free scientific
research is that all civil codes are incomplete; that is, codes have gaps
because the legislature cannot possibly foresee all problems that will
arise in the future."2  The free scientific research method applies
traditional methods of interpretation when they produce a satisfactory
solution.' " However, "[flor those matters on which the legislator had
no discernible intent, the interpreter must function like a legislator and
105. SeeLasser, supm note 85, at 1331.
106. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 466 (Supp. 2007).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. See id
109. Id.
110. Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in Fance for the Act of Things: A Study of
Judicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L. REv. 1299, 1307-08 (1988).
111. Id.
112. Id at 1307.
113. See id.
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formulate a legal rule to cover the situation.""' Unlike the legislator,
the judge who acts as legislator using the method of free scientific
research must endeavor to free himself of personal bias."5 This is
perhaps the most important and the most difficult aspect of free
scientific research."6 In reaching a decision, a judge should look to
"the social sciences, especially sociology, psychology, political
economics, and history (including the history of ideas)." 7
1. Upside of Free Scientific Research
Free scientific research is a residual method that is only employed
when traditional methods fail."8 The traditional methods of logic and
exegesis fail to provide answers to the societal expectations question.'
Under the method of free scientific research, a judge faced with the
question of what constitutes prevailing notions of society should act as
an independent legislator.'2 ° For example, when faced with the
question of whether a wireless doorbell system constitutes a
component part of a home, the judge would be called upon to remove
all personal bias and look to the social sciences to find the answer."'
On a superficial level, this method complements the societal
expectations test because both ask the same question. That is,
according to history, sociology, economics, and psychology, what are
the prevailing notions of society in this particular instance?'22
2. Downside of Free Scientific Research
The upside of free scientific research-that it asks the same
question as the societal expectations test-is also its downside. When
applied in the context of article 466, free scientific research becomes
rhetorical and self-defining. By asking essentially the same question
that the societal expectations test itself asks, free scientific research
does little to clarify how to apply article 466 to a given fact situation.
Additionally, the method has the potential for a great deal of
arbitrariness and inconsistency. " This fact is particularly true when
114. Id. at 1308.
115. Lasser, supra note 85, at 1347.
116. Tomlinson, supra note 110, at 1308.
117. Lasser, supm note 85, at 1347.
118. Tomlinson, supr note 110, at 1308.
119. See discussion supm Parts I1.A-B.
120. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 70, § 142, at 286-87.
121. SeeLasser, supranote 85, at 1347.
122. See LA. Ci. CODEANN. art. 466 (Supp. 2007); Lasser, supra note 85, at 1347.
123. SeeTomlinson, supra note 110, at 1308.
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the judge is unable to remove his personal bias from the decision-
making process.'24 While personal bias may be easy to remove in some
situations, societal expectations is especially susceptible to personal
influence. Many fact patterns involve situations that one would
encounter in everyday life, and it may be difficult for a judge to
separate personal experiences from the decision-making process.'25
D Teleological Method
The teleological method of interpretation sprung from the
method of free scientific research coupled with the idea that "to
remain just, [the law] must 'yield' before transformed economic and
social conditions."'26 Under this method, original legislative intent is
irrelevant.' 27  Rather, "the relevant question is what the current
legislative body would do if it were confronted by the problem before
the court."' 28 The distinction between free scientific research and the
teleological method can be difficult to grasp at first glance and, to
some extent, the two methods overlap.9  Under free scientific
research, judges are not free to simply disregard legislative intent.'3°
Judges are only free to act as a legislator after a thorough examination
of the traditional interpretive techniques fails to reveal a discernible
legislative intent."' However, once the judge is free to employ free
scientific research, there is little if any difference between that method
and the teleological method, as a practical matter.'2 Therefore, in the
case of article 466 and the societal expectations test, the outcome of
either method is likely to be the same. The traditional methods of
interpretation fail in the case of societal expectations, and a judge
employing free scientific research would be free to act as a legislator.'33
124. See id
125. See, e.g., Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 179 E3d 169, 171
(5th Cir. 1999) (involving furniture in a hotel); Equibank v. IRS, 749 E2d 1176, 1177 (5th
Cir. 1985) (involving chandeliers in a mansion); Lakeside Nat'l Bank of Lake Charles v.
Moreaux, 576 So. 2d 1094, 1094 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1991) (involving a septic tank and air-
conditioning pipes connected to a home); Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc., 527 So.
2d 1052, 1053 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988) (involving wall-to-wall carpeting and light fixtures in a
home); Lafleur v. Foret, 213 So. 2d 141, 142 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1968) (involving window air-
conditioning units).
126. SeeTomlinson, supm note 110, at 1309.
127. Id. at 1310.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Seeid. at 1308; discussion supra Parts II.A-B.
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His analysis at this point would be essentially the same as that of a
judge using the teleological method.'34 Accordingly, the upside and
downside of the teleological method in the specific context of the
societal expectations test are the same as those discussed in the
preceding Subpart.3 '
IV JURISPRUDENCE CONSTANTEAND STAREDECISISIN THE CONTEXT
OF SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS
Application of the societal expectations test is likely to render
inconsistent results regardless of interpretive technique utilized.'3 6
However, the need for a predictable and uniform application of
property law is manifest. The insufficiency of interpretive techniques
in resolving this problem may turn judges towards a reliance on case
law. Because of this tendency, the distinction between jurisprudence
constante and stare decisis is particularly relevant for this discussion.
A. Jurisprudence Constante versus Stare Decisis
Many consider the contrast between jurisprudence constante and
stare decisis a fundamental distinction between common law and civil
law systems. ' Others contend that in a mixed jurisdiction such as
Louisiana, the practical difference between the two concepts is
essentially nonexistent.' In the strict sense, the doctrine of stare
decisis means that a single decision by the jurisdiction's highest court
is binding on both that court and all lower courts.'39 In the absence of
action by the legislature, this decision remains the law of the land.' °
This strict application of stare decisis is admittedly tempered in the
United States.'4'
In contrast, case law is merely persuasive authority in civil law
jurisdictions.' 2 For example, when a common law court interprets a
134. SeeTomlinson, supra note l10, at 1310.
135. Seeid
136. See discussion supra Part III.
137. SeeYiANNopouLos, supra note 70, § 76, at 94.
138. Id. § 74, at 92; see Lovett, supra note 5, at 616 (citing Pierre Crabites, Louisiana
Not a Civil Law State, 9 LoY. L.J. 51, 51-52 (1928) (arguing that following the Civil War,
English law had influenced law practice in Louisiana so as to make the civil law tradition
nearly obsolete)).
139. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 70, §§ 74, 76, at 92, 94; see Tate, supra note 74, at
743.
140. SeeTate, supa note 74, at 743.
141. YIANNOPOuLOS, supranote 70, § 76, at 94.
142. Tate, supra note 74, at 743.
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statute, the law is the statute as interpreted by the court, rather than the
statute itself.'43 This is not the case in civil law jurisdictions where the
statute is the supreme source of law, regardless of judicial
interpretations.'"
However, case law gains more significance in civil law
jurisdictions under the doctrine of juisprudence constante.4 ' Under
this doctrine, a long line of well-reasoned cases applying the same rule
of law is afforded great persuasive weight in later decisions.'46 The
difference between stare decisis and jurisprudence constante is
summarized as follows:
"The two most important differences, then, between the doctrine of
juosprudence constante and the rule of stare decisis, are: (1) a single
case affords a sufficient foundation for the latter, while a series of
adjudicated cases all in accord forms the predicate of the former; and
(2) case law in civilian jurisdictions is merely law de facto, while under
the common law technique it is law de jure. A third characteristic
difference between the two doctrines of judicial precedent is that under
the common law technique an inferior court must follow the case law
announced by a superior court; under the civilian technique, in strict
theory, they are not obliged to and occasionally do not, although for
practical reasons, such as fear of reversal, inferior courts ordinarily
follow the jurisprudence of superior courts."'47
B. Jurisprudence Constante and Societal Expectations
Despite the flexibility of jurisprudence constante, Louisiana
courts, nevertheless, hesitate to depart from lines of precedent.'48 This
should not be the case with respect to societal expectations, because
the underlying premise of the test is that expectations will change. For
example, take the case of Lafleur, where the court held that window
air-conditioning units were not component parts of a building.'49
Would that case be in accordance with prevailing notions of society
today? Hyman v Ross indicated that the societal expectations had
143. See id. at 744.
144. See id
145. Id.
146. Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent" A
Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L.
RE. 775, 799 (2005).
147. Tate, supm note 74, at 744-45 (quoting Harriet Spiller Daggett et al., A
Reappraisal Appaised" A Bief for the Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TuL. L. RE. 12, 17
(1937)).
148. Seeid at 746-47.
149. Lafleur v. Foret, 213 So. 2d 141, 149 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1968).
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changed by 1994. '50 In Hyman, the court ruled that air-conditioning
units were component parts of a motel, noting the testimony of a real
estate expert that "an average prudent buyer of commercial property
would expect that the heating and air conditioning units at issue would
remain with the building.""' The court wisely did not rely on the
societal expectations as determined by the Lafleur case. Accordingly,
in applying the societal expectations test, courts must feel free to
embrace their civilian heritage and not needlessly bind themselves to
prior case law. In the particular cases of Lafleur and Hyman, by the
time the societal expectations test could even be considered
jurisprudence constante, the application of that rule to a particular fact
situation will be already outdated.
V THE FIFTH CIRCUIT PROBLEM
Federal courts are often called upon to apply state substantive law
in diversity actions.'52 Additionally, federal courts are frequently called
upon to apply state property law in cases, such as those concerning
federal estate tax, supplemental jurisdiction, federal condemnation
actions, and in federal bankruptcy actions.'53  Discussion of the
difficulties faced with respect to the application of jurisprudence
constante and stare decisis in the federal courts is particularly pertinent
in the context of article 466 because there are many instances when
this property code article might be interpreted by the federal courts,
particularly the Fifth Circuit.
A. TheErie Doctrine and Stare Decisis
Under the Erie doctrine, a federal court called upon to apply state
law "should seek the correct statement of law in the same fashion that
the highest court of the state (in which the federal court sits) would
search, evaluate, and pronounce it.'"" When the state's highest court
has not spoken on the issue, federal courts sitting in common law
states look to 'relevant state precedent, analogous decisions,
considered dicta, scholarly works and any other reliable data." ' 55
150. 26,096, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/94); 643 So. 2d 256, 261.
151. Id.
152. James L. Dennis, CapitantLecture, 63 LA. L. REv. 1003, 1008 (2003).
153. Id.
154. William E. Crawford, Life on a Federal Island in the Civilian Sea, 15 Miss. C. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1994).
155. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 152, at 1009 (quoting Hollis v. Hill, 232 E3d 460,
465 (5th Cir. 2000)).
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However, in Louisiana, legislation is the primary source of law.'56
Looking to precedent, dicta, and scholarly works is not necessarily
appropriate in a civil law jurisdiction.'57 That is, under ideal
circumstances, these are not the sources to which the Louisiana
Supreme Court would look. The difficulty of having the federal courts
interpret and apply Louisiana state law is augmented by the fact that
many federal appeals panels have no Louisiana-trained judges, and
few have more than one. " ' Thus, as a federal court, the Fifth Circuit
has a tendency to place greater emphasis on case law than is perhaps
desirable in a civil law system. 59
Even assuming that a federal court of appeals understands how
the Louisiana Supreme Court would appropriately arrive at a decision,
federal courts are faced with an additional hurdle. Although Louisiana
does not subscribe to stare decisis, federal courts are bound by the
doctrine.'6° When a federal appeals court makes a decision on
Louisiana substantive law, it will generally follow that decision in
subsequent cases unless the state supreme court rules to the contrary.6'
Therefore, the possibility arises that a federal court will erroneously
interpret and apply a code provision and then continue to do so in
subsequent cases until and unless the state supreme court is confronted
with the same issue and decides differently.' 2
The pitfall of stare decisis for federal courts, particularly the Fifth
Circuit, with respect to article 466 and the societal expectations test is
manifest. Blindly adhering to the doctrine of stare decisis will
undermine the purpose underlying the societal expectations test. Such
adherence may prevent the Fifth Circuit from interpreting article 466
in accordance with prevailing notions of society.
B. Possible Soluions
Suppose that both Lafle&63 and Hyman'6 had been heard before
the Fifth Circuit rather than in state court. The Fifth Circuit, as a
156. Id. at 1006.
157. Seeidat 1009.
158. Id.
159. See id
160. Id. at 1013.
161. Id
162. Id
163. Lafleur v. Foret, 213 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1968).
164. Hyman v. Ross, 26,096 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/94); 643 So. 2d 256.
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federal court, is bound by its prior decision under the doctrine of stare
decisis. Yet, several outcomes are possible.'65
First, the Fiftfi Circuit may decide that the facts of Hyman are
sufficiently similar to the facts of Lafleur and, therefore, the decision
in the Lafleur case is binding. If this were the case, the court would
decide that as late as 1994, society does not expect air conditioners to
be component parts of buildings. Assuming that the outcome in the
actual case was correct, it is clear that this application of stare decisis
leads the court to an erroneous decision.
Second, the Fifth Circuit might distinguish the facts of Hyman
from the facts of Lafleur on any one of several grounds. The court
could point to differences in the manner of installation, differences in
the types of units used, or to the fact that one case involved a residence
and the other involved commercial property.'66 In the civil law context,
drawing distinctions in this manner looks very similar to exegesis.' 7
Any distinction drawn by the court is essentially the same idea as
developing an exegesis construct. As discussed above, drawing
constructs will ultimately create an arbitrary body of case law.' 8 While
an arbitrary body of case law is undesirable in a civil law jurisdiction,
it is even more problematic in a federal court bound by stare decisis.
Third, the Fifth Circuit could recognize that the societal
expectations concept is not entirely at odds with stare decisis when the
rule of law is properly framed. That is, the Fifth Circuit could
recognize that the proper rule from Lafleur is that whether air-
conditioning units constitute a component part of an immovable
depends on the prevailing notions of society and not on prior decisions
of a court."' In other words, the law that must be followed under
Lafleur and stare decisis is that each fact situation must be examined
under the context of current societal expectations, so that the factors
controlling the decision in a previous case are not necessarily present
in subsequent cases. Therefore, in each case the court must examine
the facts anew and use its discretion to reach the appropriate decision.
Other cases with similar fact patterns may be relevant but are not
controlling. The Fifth Circuit, as well as the state courts, should adopt
this approach.
165. Dennis, supra note 152, at 1013.
166. See, e.g., Hyman, 26,096 at p. 9; 643 So. 2d at 261 (involving commercial
property); Lafleur, 213 So. 2d at 142 (involving residential property).
167. See discussion supra Part IJI.B.
168. See supra Part IHB.
169. SeeLA. CIV. CODEANN. art. 466 (Supp. 2007); Lafleur, 213 So. 2d at 148.
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VI. PRACTICAL APPROACH
Despite all the controversy over societal expectations, little is
written concerning how to properly apply the test. Civilian methods of
interpretation and the doctrines of stare decisis and jurisprudence
constante do not provide a workable solution.' When courts are
called upon to apply article 466, this Comment proposes a common
sense approach, which will, to some extent, require the use of judicial
discretion. As this Comment illustrated, the use of judicial discretion
is both the strength and the weakness of article 466. Judicial discretion
allows the flexibility needed, but also places a great deal of
responsibility in the hands of judges.
A. PermanentAttachment
The first paragraph of article 466 provides: "Things permanently
attached to a building or other construction are its component parts."'7'
This paragraph did not exist independently under the previous version
of article 466, which read: "Things permanently attached to a building
or other construction, such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or
other installations, are its component parts."'' 2 When the current first
paragraph is considered in conjunction with the rest of the code article,
it is clear that this paragraph does not spell out any test, but rather
states the general rule of law.'73 In contrast, the second two paragraphs
enunciate which situations lead to permanent attachment.'
Accordingly, judges must not view this paragraph as a test or
requirement that must be met. Rather, the first paragraph is a broad
rule of law, which the second two paragraphs explain with more
specificity.
B. Immovables as a Matter ofLaw
The second paragraph of article 466 provides: "Things such as
plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical, or other installations are
component parts of a building or other construction as a matter of
law."'7 5  This paragraph sets out an illustrative, rather than an
170. See discussion supa Parts HI-IV
171. LA.CW.CODEANN. art. 466.
172. Id. (1980).
173. See id. (Supp. 2007).
174. See id.
175. Id.
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exhaustive, list of items for a judge to consider.'76 Things falling within
the contemplation of the second paragraph are component parts as a
matter of law, meaning that actual permanent attachment is
irrelevant.' When faced with a component parts case, the judge
should look to this paragraph and decide whether the movables in
question clearly fall under this paragraph. When a movable clearly
falls within the contemplation of the second paragraph, the inquiry
ends. However, where a movable falls under the gambit of "other
installation" or does not otherwise clearly fall under one of the listed
types of installations, this Comment suggests that the judge should
proceed onto the societal expectations test and use it as a tie breaker.
C SubstantialDamage
The first portion of the last paragraph of article 466 provides that
"[o]ther things are considered to be permanently attached to a building
or other construction if they cannot be removed without substantial
damage to themselves or to the building or other construction."'78
Substantial damage is an objective test.' 9 Therefore, a judge does not
consider the subjective intent of the owner of the building or other
construction in deciding whether removal will cause substantial
damage.'80 The degree of attachment of the movable is a question of
fact from which the court draws legal conclusions.'8 ' Therefore, when
faced with the question of substantial damage, the judge must evaluate
the evidence presented and use his discretion to draw the appropriate
legal conclusion.
D Prevailing Notions in Society
The second half of the final paragraph of article 466 provides that
things are considered permanently attached if, "according to prevailing
notions in society, they are considered to be its component parts."'82 If
a movable fails to meet any of the previous tests for immobilization,
176. SeeYiannopoulos, supra note 5, at 1386.
177. See id.
178. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 466 (Supp. 2007).
179. SeeYiannopoulos, supm note 5, at 1386.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 1386-87.
182. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 466 (Supp. 2007).
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then the judge may look to the societal expectations test. There are
two steps to this test.'83
First, the judge must characterize the nature of the building or
other construction in question."M Although this step has not been
readily discussed in doctrinal materials, examination of prerevision
cases applying societal expectations reveals that this is a necessary
consideration.'85 As one judge has stated:
While the classification of the [movable in question] as a component
part pursuant to 'societal expectations' in article 466 can be
rationalized, it is opined that this standard fails to consider an equally
paramount consideration. An assessment of the premises and the
relationship of the movable to the function of the immovable is implicit
in the existence velnon of a component part of [those] premises.'
Either implicitly or explicitly, this approach was the one taken by
most courts applying the societal expectations test before the
revision.' 7 However, this methodology conflicts with the comments to
article 466.'
Both the comments and doctrine agree that article 466, as enacted
in 1978, represented a change in the law in that article 467, which
articulated the use or convenience test, was suppressed.'88 In other
183. See Exxon Corp. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 00-2093, pp. 2-3 (La. App. 1 Cir.
12/28/0 1); 805 So. 2d 432,438 (Fitzsimmons, J., concurring).
184. Seeid
185. See, e.g., Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 E3d 909, 918 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e are
convinced that in light of the relevant 'societal expectations'-those of the offshore oil and
gas drilling and production industry-[the drilling rig] cannot be considered permanently
attached to Texaco's platform."); Equibank v. IRS, 749 E2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1985) ("'We
are talking about [what] an ordinary man who purchases a house with ordinary prudence
ought to know and ought to expect."' (quoting the trial court testimony of Professor
Yiannopoulos)); Exxon Corp., 00-2093 at p. 7; 805 So. 2d at 436 (majority opinion)
("Undoubtedly, a purchaser of a coker facility would expect it to be functional, with all
required pipes, when possession was taken."); Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Shel-Boze, Inc., 527
So. 2d 1052, 1055 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988) ("Undoubtedly, a reasonable person buying a
residence expects finished flooring to be there when he or she takes possession. The societal
expectation is to have finished flooring, such as carpeting.").
186. Exxon Corp., 00-2093 at pp. 2-3; 805 So. 2d at 438 (Fitzsimmons, J.,
concurring).
187. See, e.g., Coulter, 117 E3d at 918; Equibank, 749 E2d at 1178; Exxon Corp., 00-
2093 at p. 7; 805 So. 2d at 436 (majority opinion); Shel-Boze, 527 So. 2d at 1055.
188. See LA. Cv. CODE ANN. art. 466 (1987); see also, e.g., Lovett, supra note 5, at
673 (noting that comment (a) to article 466 states that it is a new provision, comment (d)
states that article 467 is "suppressed," and comment (e) states that article 469 is still relevant);
Yiannopoulos, supm note 5, at 1386 (noting that comment (e) provides that article 469 is
reproduced and still relevant and that there are no like references to articles 467 and 468).
189. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 466; Lovett, supra note 5, at 673; Yiannopoulos,
supra note 5, at 1386.
1688
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words, article 466 supposedly eliminated the practice of considering
the use or convenience of a movable with relation to the immovable in
deciding whether immobilization had occurred.'" Yet, prerevision
cases applying the societal expectations test considered this
relationship.' The question becomes, then, should this practice
continue?
This Comment posits that not only should this practice continue,
but it should be an essential and explicit step in the societal
expectations analysis. Fortunately, the comments to article 466 are not
the law and therefore are not binding on the courts. There is little
practical reason to apply the societal expectations test without
considering the use or convenience of the movable in question. What
society expects to constitute a component part of an immovable
necessarily depends, to some degree, on the nature of the immovable
and the relationship of the movable to that immovable.
Accordingly, the societal expectations analysis should proceed as
follows. First, the judge should determine the nature of the immovable
in question. Second, the judge should consider the movable and its
relationship to the immovable. In both of these steps the judge should
bear in mind the prevailing notions of society.
VII. CONCLUSION
What constitutes a component part? Academics, practitioners,
and the state legislature have struggled with this question since the
drafting of the Civil Code of 1870. Yet, well over a century later, the
question remains largely unanswered. Civilian methods of interpreta-
tion do little to illuminate a solution. Stare decisis and jurisprudence
constante pose the problem of ignoring modem prevailing notions of
society in favor of relying on decisions of the past. This is particularly
problematic in the federal courts, but it poses a problem in the state
courts as well. What solutions remain?
The lessons from the past and the hopes for the future are two
fold. First, the legislature cannot possibly draft a code article that
anticipates all future unforeseen events. Attempts to do so have failed,
190. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 466; Lovett, supm note 5, at 673; Yiannopoulos,
supra note 5, at 1386.
191. See, e.g., Coulter, 117 F3d at 918 (noting that an oil rig's removal from a platform
does not functionally impair either); Equibank, 749 E2d at 1178 (noting that chandeliers take
special expertise to install or uninstall and are component parts); Exxon Corp., 00-2093 at pp.
7-8; 805 So. 2d at 436 (noting that the purchaser of the facility would expect the plumbing to
be functional and therefore the parts were immovable); Shel-Boze, 527 So. 2d at 1055 (noting
that carpeting installed in a residence was a factor proving its readiness for occupancy).
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and thus Code articles became quickly outdated. There can be no
hard-and-fast rules regarding what constitutes prevailing notions of
society because modem notions are inherently subject to change.
Recognizing this problem, the Legislature provided a rule of flexibility
and judicial discretion that, if properly utilized, will not become
outdated: the societal expectations test. Second, judges must utilize
the wide discretion inherent in the societal expectations test but utilize
it wisely. Judges must evaluate each fact situation anew, in light of
current considerations, rather than complacently relying on case law.
Blindly adhering to the past will undermine the beauty and purpose of
societal expectations, which will, in turn, undermine the beauty and
purpose of article 466.
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